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Abstract: Most intervention studies have been silent on the assumed structure of the economic 
system—implicitly imposing implausible assumptions—despite the fact that inference depends 
crucially on such issues.  This paper identifies the cross-effects of intervention and the level of 
exchange rates using the likely timing of intervention, macroeconomic announcements as 
instruments and the nonlinear structure of the intervention reaction function.  Proper 
identification of the effects of intervention indicates that it effectively changes the levels of 
exchange rates.  Such inference depends on careful attention to nonlinearity and seemingly 
innocuous identification assumptions.  
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Christopher J. Neely is a research officer in the Research Department of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis.  Joshua Ulrich and Justin Hauke provided research assistance.  The views 
expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect views of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve System.  Central bank intervention is the practice of monetary authorities buying and selling 
currency in the foreign exchange market to influence exchange rates.  Although some major 
central banks have intervened less frequently recently, all central banks retain it as a tool in their 
arsenals and some still commonly employ it.   
Intervention researchers seek to answer several questions:  What effect does intervention 
have on the level and volatility of exchange rates?  To what conditions do central banks respond?  
Secondarily, how do factors such as coordination, direction, secrecy and amount of intervention 
affect the answers to those questions?  Understanding the dynamic impact of intervention on 
exchange rates is a first step toward understanding its potential impact on inflation and output 
through changes in exchange rates and expectations.  And describing the impact of intervention 
could inform our understanding of exchange rate microstructure.   
The literature on intervention has primarily addressed these questions with event 
studies—examinations of exchange rate behavior around intervention.  Recently, these event 
studies have begun to use higher-frequency data, combined with some knowledge of the timing 
of intervention.  High-frequency studies are handicapped, however, by the lack of accurately 
timed intervention data.
1   
More importantly, while event studies find important correlations, they do not uncover 
structural relations without additional, often implausible, assumptions about the structure of the 
economy.  That is, event studies describe how exchange rates behave around periods of 
intervention, rather than how intervention influences exchange rates.   
                                                 
1  Only the Swiss National Bank publicly provides intervention times.  The Bank of Canada has provided 
intervention times confidentially to certain researchers.  Intervention times for other central banks must be inferred 
from press reports; Fischer (2007) shows that Reuters’s report times were fairly inaccurate for Swiss National Bank 
intervention.   
  1In practice, because central banks often seek to counter recent exchange rate trends, a 
simple regression of exchange rate returns on intervention will typically imply a perverse (or 
zero) impact of intervention on exchange rates.  This tells one nothing about the actual impact of 
intervention, however, because the regression coefficient does not consistently estimate any 
structural parameter.   
To properly sort out the dynamic cross-impacts of intervention and exchange rates, one 
must explicitly confront the important issue of identification—assumptions necessary to obtain 
consistent estimates of structural parameters.
2  Identification problems are ubiquitous in 
econometrics and especially important for those who advise policy makers.  Economic policy 
reacts to economic conditions, which depend on economic policy.   
This paper proposes and estimates an explicit, identified, dynamic structure for U.S. 
intervention and uses it to illustrate the dependence of inference on identification assumptions.  
Three elements underlie the construction of this system:  1) Modest knowledge of the likely 
timing of U.S. intervention; 2)  macro announcement surprise data to be used as instruments for 
exchange rates;  and 3) a nonlinear structure to identify and construct impulse responses.   
The systems constructed with these elements imply that intervention has the desired 
effect on the level of exchange rates: USD purchases raise the value of the USD.  And overnight 
exchange rate returns predict intervention in the expected way: U.S. authorities “leaned against 
the wind” with respect to overnight (and prior) returns.  There is evidence, however, that U.S. 
authorities leaned with the wind during the business day of intervention.  
To illustrate how important identification assumptions are to inference, this paper 
compares the nonlinear identified results with those of two other models: an identified linear 
  2model and a nonlinear model with an unjustifiably restricted covariance matrix.  While the data 
reject these models, they serve as useful benchmarks to judge the importance of identification 
assumptions.  
The next section briefly discusses the literature on central bank intervention.  The third 
section describes the data while the fourth confronts the issues of stability and identification to 
infer the cross-effects of U.S. intervention and exchange rates in a linear system.  Then nonlinear 
systems are introduced and estimated.  The final section concludes.   
2.  Studies of the Effects of Intervention 
  Event studies, which are the most common way to study the effects of intervention, can 
be informal examinations of price behavior or formal analyses that incorporate statistical tests.  
2.1  Event Studies With Daily Data 
Many papers describe themselves as event studies: Fatum (2002), Fatum and Hutchinson 
(2002, 2003a, 2003b), Edison, Cashin and Liang (2003).  Fatum and Hutchinson (2003b) explain 
the advantages to this method.   
“An event study framework is better suited to the study of sporadic and intense periods of 
official intervention, juxtaposed with continuously changing exchange rates, than 
standard time-series studies. Focusing on daily Bundesbank and US official intervention 
operations, we identify separate intervention ‘episodes’ and analyse the subsequent effect 
on the exchange rate.”-- Fatum and Hutchinson (2003b) 
Other papers can reasonably be described as event studies—even though they do not use 
that term—because they characterize the behavior of exchange rates around periods of 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 Parameters that are derived from microeconomic models are often termed “deep” structural parameters.  This paper 
  3intervention, without explicitly identifying structural relations:  Humpage (1999, 2000), Aguilar 
and Nydalh (2000), Kim, Kortian and Sheen (2000), Ito (2002), Chaboud and Humpage (2003), 
Rogers and Siklos (2003).  Typically, these papers statistically test if exchange rates—or some 
function of exchange rates—behave unusually on or after days of intervention.  
2.2  Intraday Event Studies 
  More recently, a third group of papers have used intraday data to evaluate the behavior of 
exchange rates at very high frequencies around the times of intervention.  Fischer and Zurlinden 
(1999), Payne and Vitale (2003) and Pasquariello (2002) have exploited Swiss National Bank 
(SNB) data on the exact times of its intervention, not just the day and amount.  Fischer and 
Zurlinden (1999) look at irregular observations at times of intervention to examine the effects of 
intervention.  Payne and Vitale (2003) use 15-minute exchange rate data to quantify the effects 
of intervention operations on the USD/CHF rate.  Pasquariello (2002) looks at a wider variety of 
exchange rate behavior—including spreads—in a similar exercise.  Beattie and Fillion (1999) 
use confidential timed intervention data from the Bank of Canada to similarly investigate the 
effects of Canadian intervention.  Fatum and King (2005) compare the effects of rule-based and 
discretionary Canadian intervention on high-frequency data.  They find that intervention does 
systematically affect the CAD/USD and might be associated with reduced volatility.  Finally, 
Dominguez (2003a, 2003b) regresses 5-minute exchange rate returns and volatility on leads and 
lags of news announcement and intervention news dummies, taken from newswire reports, 
during days of U.S. intervention from 1987 to 1993.  Dominguez interprets the coefficients on 
intervention and news as the impact of those events on exchange rate behavior.  Fischer (2007) 
                                                                                                                                                             
uses the more traditional meaning of structural:  The equations/parameters have economic interpretations. 
  4implicitly criticizes the reliance on such newswire reports by showing that they were fairly 
inaccurate for SNB intervention, whose times are publicly known.  
While intraday studies of intervention have been tremendously valuable in understanding 
the impact of intervention, at least two problems remain.  First, while intraday studies only look 
at short event windows, intervention might have its full effects over days or weeks.
3  Therefore 
such studies do not really answer the question of interest: What is the dynamic response of 
exchange rates to intervention?  Second, the paucity of exact intervention timing prevents such 
studies’ conclusions from being cross-checked in other samples. Inference could be fragile.  
2.3  Identified Studies of Intervention 
  The principal weakness of event studies is that while they characterize the behavior of 
exchange rates around intervention, they do not uncover the causal structure of the economy.  To 
determine the effect of intervention on exchange rates, one must consider how the economic 
system simultaneously determines exchange rates and intervention.  Even single-equation 
methods, e.g., two-stage least squares, must implicitly assume a structure for the system.  
  Kim (2003) and Kearns and Rigobon (2005) explicitly model structural economic 
relations to identify the effect of intervention on exchange rates.  Kim (2003) used monthly data 
from 1974:1–1996:12 in a structural VAR to examine the effects of intervention and monetary 
policy on a trade-weighted exchange rate.  Neely (2005a and 2005b), however, shows that the 
intervention effects in Kim’s (2003) structural VAR model are not identified.  They might, 
however, be interpreted as one set of responses that is consistent with the data.  Additionally, the 
intervention variable—purchases of USD—in Kim (2003) is misidentified as purchases of 
                                                 
3 About 40 percent of central bankers surveyed by Neely (2000) believed that intervention takes at least a few days 
to have its full effect. 
  5foreign exchange.  Therefore Kim’s model actually implies an implausible perverse impact of 
intervention.  In a novel study, Kearns and Rigobon (2005) exploit structural breaks in the 
Japanese and Australian authorities’ reaction functions to estimate a model of intervention.  
2.5  Structural Stability 
  The use of structural breaks in Kearns and Rigobon (2005) ironically underscores another 
problem with intervention studies: structural instability.  Structural stability is particularly 
problematic for intervention studies because the coefficients of reduced-form relations will 
generally change with the intervention reaction function.  This paper will attempt to confront the 
issue of structural stability by looking for a period in which the reduced-form parameters are 
relatively stable.  
3.  The Data 
  This analysis uses two U.S. intervention series:  U.S. in-market purchases of millions of 
USD in the Deutschemark/U.S. dollar (DEM/USD) market and the Japanese yen/U.S. dollar 
(JPY/USD) market.  The intervention data begin in March 1973 and end in December 2001. 
Olsen and Associates provided 5-minute returns on the DEM, JPY, CHF, and GBP spot 
exchange rates against the USD from 1987 through 1998.  The data were filtered to remove 
obvious errors.  Haver Analytics provided various macroeconomic announcements, as well as 
survey expectations of those announcements.  The surprises constructed from macro 
announcement data will be used as instruments for exchange rate returns. 
Because—as will be shown—almost all U.S. intervention occurs during the business day, 
the intraday exchange rate data are valuable for identifying structural relations by separately 
constructing business-day and overnight exchange rate returns.  The overnight return (rpm,t) is 
  6from 4 p.m. of day t-1 to 7 a.m. of day t, and the business-day return (ram,t) is from 7 a.m. to 4 
p.m of day t.  Conversion from GMT to New York time accounted for daylight savings time.   
  Figure 1 shows the time series of the intervention and exchange rates over the post 
Bretton Woods era.  Levels, frequency and direction of intervention appear to be unstable over 
the whole period.  For example, there was a clear shift to more intervention in the JPY in the 
1980s.  Indeed, it appears that the most likely candidates for a “stable” intervention process—
with both USD purchases and sales—are the eras of 1975 through 1980 and 1987 through 1991. 
(Only the latter period has transactions in both the DEM and JPY.)  
  More formal structural break statistics in a linear VAR framework—results omitted for 
brevity—confirmed what casual examination of  Figure 1 suggested:  The system of intervention 
with intraday returns (two per day) is generally unstable.  That is, rolling structural break 
statistics are usually able to reject that the parameters of the VAR system are constant over 
successive two-year periods.  The evidence against stability is relatively weak in the 1987-1990 
period, however.  Therefore the examination of the cross-effects of intervention and exchange 
rates will be undertaken in the 1987-1990 period.   
  The exchange rate panels of Figure 1 also display the purchasing power parity (PPP)-
implied fundamental values—interpolated from monthly to daily frequency—for the exchange 
rate. Casual observation suggests that the U.S. authorities tend to buy the dollar when it is 
“overvalued” by the PPP measure and sell it under opposite circumstances.  Statistical tests, such 
as those in Neely (2002), formally confirm this impression.
4  That is, intervention tends to be 
positive (negative) when the exchange rate is below (above) its fundamental value.  Deviations 
                                                 
4 This tendency explains the results of Neely (1998) that the U.S. authorities tend to make excess returns on 
intervention by buying below long-run fundamentals and selling above those fundamentals.  Frenkel, Pierdzioch and 
  7from the daily PPP-fundamental help to explain intervention.  Such deviations will be included 
as explanatory variables for intervention and exchange rates.  
  Table 1 presents summary statistics on these measures of intervention and exchange rates 
during their common sample, from 1987-1990.  The U.S. authorities intervened on 15.7 percent 
of days in the DEM and 14.2 percent of days in the JPY.  Intervention is autocorrelated.  The 
conditional probability of DEM intervention on day t, given that there was intervention on day t-
1, is close to 55 percent, while the probability of intervention, given no intervention on day t-1, is 
about 8 percent.  Statistics for intervention in the JPY were very similar.  Mean exchange rate 
changes are almost zero and have little autocorrelation, as one might expect.   
Table 2 shows the contemporaneous correlations among the variables.  Several relations 
are worth noting.  First, the correlation between intervention and exchange rate returns (red 
shading) are typically moderately negative in such data.  Leaning-against-the-wind intervention 
doubtless causes this negative correlation, which probably accounts for frequent failure to find 
that intervention influences the exchange rate in the desired direction in studies that look at daily 
correlations.  Second, adjacent a.m. and p.m. returns are correlated (green cells).  Third, 
contemporaneous DEM and JPY returns are highly correlated (brown shading).     
4.  The Effects of Central Bank Intervention:  A Linear Framework 
  The econometric problems associated with determining the effects of central bank 
intervention—stability, omitted variables, the unusual distribution of intervention, and 
identification—must be solved to infer the cross-effects of intervention and exchange rates.  This 
paper will initially estimate dynamic impacts with a benchmark, linear near-VAR 
                                                                                                                                                             
Stadtmann (2003) studied the inclination of Japanese authorities to intervene to “target” exchange rates.  Taylor 
(2003) uses the degree of misalignment within a Markov switching model of intervention.  
  8representation—which ignores the unusual distribution of intervention—before comparing and 
contrasting these linear results with those of the preferred nonlinear frameworks. 
4.1  Identifying Assumptions from Macro Announcements and the Timing of Intervention 
Both exchange rate returns and volatility influence the size and probability of intervention 
within a day, but intervention simultaneously influences exchange rate behavior.  To estimate the 
structural effect of intervention on exchange rates, or vice versa, one must assume a structure for 
the system governing exchange rates and intervention.  An instrument for either variable, 
coupled with the assumption that the structural shocks are orthogonal, would be sufficient to 
identify the cross-effects of intervention and exchange rates in a linear system. A good 
instrument should be highly predictive of the regressor for which it serves as an instrument, but 
not structurally predictive of the dependent variable.   
It is often difficult to find good instruments.  The surprise components of macroeconomic 
announcements—the first report of the macro variable, less its median survey expectations—may 
be good instruments for exchange rates, however.  Such announcements—typically made at 7:30 
or 8:30 a.m., New York time—strongly predict exchange rates (Faust et al. (2003)), but 
presumably do not directly influence intervention.
5  While macroeconomic surprises represent 
revisions to estimated fundamentals that could conceivably generate intervention, bias in the 
coefficients would require the intervention authorities to observe, (strongly) reassess 
fundamentals and react directly to the announcement within hours.  This seems very unlikely.
6  
                                                 
5 Galati, Melick and Micu (2002) used macro announcement data as regressors to control for the effect of shocks in 
their study of intervention’s effect on option-implied moments.   Announcements could indirectly influence 
intervention through exchange market effects and still be valid instruments.  
6 Private conversations with central bankers involved in reserve management/intervention have confirmed that 
intervention is very unlikely to respond directly to announcements.  While using macro announcements to identify 
the cross-effects of intervention and exchange rates seems very plausible, all identification assumptions—like 
models themselves—are necessarily approximations and subject to criticism.  For example, Faust and Leeper (1997) 
  9Indeed, the extensive intervention reaction function literature ignores the idea that macro 
announcements themselves predict intervention, though announcements have been used in 
exchange rate equations.   
One can estimate the system more precisely by exploiting the fact that both the policy action 
(intervention) and the potential instrument (macro announcements) occur during the business 
day.
7  Breaking up the exchange rate return into overnight (rpm,t) and business-day returns (ram,t) 
isolates the business day return that is simultaneous with intervention and macro announcements.  
This increases the predictive power of the instrument and isolates the effect of intervention on 
exchange rates.  
How does one know that U.S. intervention typically occurs during the business day?  
Although the U.S. authorities do not publicly release the times of intervention, one can estimate 
them from the timing of intervention news.  Olsen and Associates conveniently provides 
Reuters’s headline news data on days of G-3 intervention, from August 18, 1989, through 
August 15, 1995.  Figure 2 shows the hours of reported U.S. intervention for this sample in the 
DEM (top panel) and JPY (lower panel).  The great majority of U.S. intervention reports for the 
DEM and JPY markets were between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., New York time.  This is consistent with 
Goodhart and Hesse (1993) and Humpage (1999), who report that U.S. intervention generally 
occurs before the London markets close at 11 a.m., New York time.
8   
                                                                                                                                                             
characterize the shortcomings of long-run identification restrictions, as used in Blanchard and Quah (1989).  Faust, 
Swanson and Wright (2004) disapprove of the often-used Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) monetary VAR 
assumptions.  Neely, Roy and Whiteman (2001) criticized Hansen and Singleton’s (1983) CCAPM identification 
scheme for using weak instruments.  Indeed, Sims (1980) even objects to the textbook example of using weather to 
identify shifts in agricultural supply curves. 
7 Humpage (1999, 2000) used similar timing of morning and end-of-business exchange rates in some of his studies. 
8 The figure is similar to one in Dominguez (2003a).  Slight differences between the figures are probably due to 
different interpretations of news headlines.  The inaccuracy of Reuters’s reports cited by Fischer (2007) is not nearly 
large enough to refute the conclusion from Figure 2, that the vast majority of U.S. intervention occurs during New 
York business hours. 
  10The long literature on choosing instrument sets ultimately recommends a parsimonious 
instrument set that strongly predicts the regressor.  For good distributional results, Stock, Wright 
and Yogo (2002) provide a function that specifies desired F-statistics as a function of the number 
of instruments.  For one instrument, they recommend an F-statistic of 10.  Therefore the optimal 
instrument set was chosen to maximize the F statistic for the linear regression of the business-
day exchange rate return on every possible instrument set from the 6 announcement surprises 
with the highest univariate t statistics.  The shock to the U.S. trade balance is the best instrument 
for both exchange rates;  it very strongly predicts both DEM and JPY business day returns, 
having extremely high F statistics of 59.2 and 49.9, respectively.   
4.2  The Structure of the Linear System 
It seems desirable, in providing a benchmark against which to assess the importance of the 
nonlinear results to be presented later, to estimate a linear model with a similar identification 






































































































































































δ δ ,  
where rpm,t and ram,t are the log exchange rate changes from 4 p.m. on t-1 to 7 a.m. on t and from 
7 a.m. on t to 4 p.m. on t; It is the amount of USD purchased by U.S. authorities on day t; mat is 
the macroeconomic announcement shock (actual less expected) on day t; pppt is the deviation 
from purchasing-power parity; and  ( ) I u u E t t = '.
9  The contemporaneous interaction matrix 
permits 1) rpm,t to influence intervention (δpm);  2) ram,t to influence intervention (δam);  3)  
correlation between rpm,t and ram,t (ρ);  and 4) intervention can influence ram,t (β).   
                                                 
9 The regressor set is basically consistent with the practice in the literature.  See the classic survey by Edison (1993).  
  11The following assumptions identify the linear model:  Excluding the macroeconomic 
announcement from the intervention equation identifies the impact of returns on intervention, 
δam. This permits the assumption of uncorrelated structural shocks to identify the 
contemporaneous impact of returns on intervention, β. The assumption that overnight returns are 
predetermined identifies the other contemporaneous coefficients, δpm and ρ.  
The system can be estimated equation by equation with DEM/USD and JPY/USD returns 
and U.S. intervention data from 1987 through 1990.  Because overnight returns (rpm,t) are 
predetermined, the coefficients of the overnight return equation can be consistently estimated by 
ordinary least squares (OLS).  The intervention equation (It) can then be estimated by 
instrumental variables, using the error from the first equation as an instrument for overnight 
returns (rpm,t) and the macroeconomic announcement shock(s) (mat) as instruments for business-
day returns (ram,t).  Finally the business-day returns (ram,t) equation can also be estimated by 
instrumental variables, using the errors from the first two equations as instruments for evening 
returns (rpm,t) and intervention (It), respectively.
10
The Bayesian information criterion (Schwarz (1978)) chooses a lag length of three lags for 
both exchange rates, from a maximum of 20 lags, for the reduced-form representation of  (1).   
4.3  What Effect Does Intervention Have on Returns in the Linear Model? 
  Figure 3 shows the effect of a one-standard-deviation U.S. purchase of USD in the linear 
model of DEM/USD and JPY/USD levels, along with a bootstrapped 80 percent confidence 
interval.  The impacts at each horizon are measured as the cumulative sums of the impacts to the 
                                                 
10  An equivalent way to think about the identification is as follows:  Because the macroeconomic announcement 
shock appears only in the equation for business-day returns (ram,t), one can estimate/identify δam as the ratio of the 
appropriate elements of the reduced forms for equations 2 and 3.   The restriction that the structural shocks have a 
  12a.m. and p.m. returns.  Intervention has no significant impact on the DEM exchange rate; the 
point estimate is essentially zero.  In contrast, the estimated effect on the JPY/USD is positive 
and significant, initially about 11 basis points, rising to 14 basis points over the impulse horizon.  
The identified linear model finds a positive effect of intervention on the JPY/USD exchange rate 
despite the negative contemporaneous correlations between the variables (Table 2). 
There is no evidence that the dynamic effect of intervention is greater than the static 
impact.  Many central bankers who actually conduct intervention, however, believe that the 
dynamic impact is greater than the static impact (Neely (2000)).  All of the responding 
intervention practitioners believe that intervention is effective in influencing exchange rates and 
nearly 40 percent of them believe that its maximal effect takes at least a few days.  The evidence 
in Figure 3 lacks the power to either refute or confirm this hypothesis.  
4.4  What Effects Do Returns Have on Intervention in the Linear Model?   
A ubiquitous finding in the intervention literature is that central banks “lean against the 
wind.”  That is, central banks tend to buy (sell) the domestic currency if it has recently 
depreciated (appreciated).  This stylized fact is consistent with the dynamic impact of a shock to 
returns on intervention, shown in Figure 4.  Business day (ram,t) and overnight (rpm,t) return 
shocks have a significant, negative impact on intervention for both exchange rates.  U.S. 
intervention in the JPY market seems to react more strongly to overnight returns than to business 
day returns.  The impacts of overnight and business day returns are more similar to each other in 
the DEM market.  
                                                                                                                                                             
diagonal covariance matrix (D) identifies the rest of the contemporaneous interaction matrix (δpm, ρ and β) from the 
estimated reduced form covariance matrix.  
  135.  Central Bank Intervention and Exchange Rate Returns:  A Friction-Model Framework 
5.1  The Friction Model System 
The results from the linear representation are not entirely satisfactory because central bank 
intervention has an unusual distribution, being frequently equal to zero (see Figure 1).  It is well 
known that linear models produce inconsistent estimates of the parameters of limited-dependent 
processes.  To investigate whether the linear representation is adequate or misleading, one can 
construct a nonlinear model of the interaction between exchange rates and intervention that 
follows the spirit and basic assumptions of the benchmark linear representation.     
The heart of the nonlinear system is a friction model that permits the dependent variable—
intervention—to be insensitive to its determinants over a range of values (Rosett (1959)).
11  This 
is appropriate for a variable like intervention that takes the value zero for a large proportion of 
observations.  The following friction-model framework, for example, characterizes intervention:   
(2)     if    t I t t am a t pm p t u a X A r r I , 1 1 , , + + + + = δ δ 0 < t I  
(3)         i f     0 = t I 0 = t I  
(4)     if      t I t t am a t pm p t u a X A r r I , 1 1 , , + − + + = δ δ 0 > t I
where Xt is a vector of all explanatory variables—lags of endogenous variables, the macro 
announcement instrument and deviations from purchasing power parity—excluding the 
constant.
12  To maintain notational simplicity, Xt includes the macro announcement but the 
corresponding element of A1 equals zero. 
                                                 
11  Rosett (1959) describes the friction model as an extension of the Tobit model (Tobin (1958)).   Maddala (1986) 
provides a very readable introduction to limited dependent variable models, like the friction and Tobit models.  
Almekinders and Eijffinger (1996) used a friction model to study central bank reaction functions.  
12 This friction model imposes symmetry on the authority’s reaction function.  One could permit the constants in (2) 
and (4)—{a1,–a1}—to differ in value as well as sign.  One might also estimate an unobservable censoring threshold, 
but this introduces significant computational difficulties and seems unwise given that some values of intervention 
are very close to zero (e.g., $3 million) compared with the overall scale of intervention.  
  14   The structural model for the system is conditional on the value that intervention takes.  If 
, the structural model is equations  0 ≠ t I (2) and (4) along with the following: 
(5)    t pm t t pm u X A a r , 0 0 , + + =
(6)  . t am t t t pm t am u X A a I r r , 2 2 , , + + + + = β ρ
13   
As with A1, the element of A0 corresponding to the macro announcement equals zero.  The 
structural shocks—{ }—have covariance matrix Ω, with assumed structure:   t am t I t pm u u u , , , , ,





















Note that ω12 need not be restricted to equal zero, as it must be in the linear model.   
If  , then the structural equation for   becomes:   0 = t I t am r ,
(8)    t am t t pm t am u X A a r r , 2 2 , , + + + = ρ
and (3) describes It’s behavior.  Appendix A describes the identification of the structural 
parameters of the model from estimable moments.  While much of the intuition for the 
identification of the model carries through from the linear case, the nonlinearity assists in 
identification.  In particular, the Appendix shows that the system identifies the parameters of 
(6)—the  equation—without restricting ω t am r , 12 to be zero.
14  Contrasting the results with and 
without that seemingly innocuous assumption will illustrate the sensitivity of the inference to 
identification assumptions. 
                                                 
13 Note that observed intervention appears on the right-hand side of the equation, not the value of shadow 
intervention, as in Nelson and Olson (1978).  Sickles and Schmidt (1978) discuss the differences in interpretation 
and estimation between the two types of models.   
14  This identification scheme is grossly similar to that of Kearns and Rigobon (2005) in the following way: That 
paper assumed a structural break in the intervention threshold, giving two sets of reduced-form moments—one set 
from the first subsample, one set from the second—and only one more parameter.  Similarly, in the present 
  15  The likelihood function for the system is as follows:   
(9)   
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where fΩ00 is the normal likelihood with variance term ω00 and fΩ12 is the bivariate normal 
likelihood with covariance matrix Ω12, the intersection of the 2
nd and 3
rd rows and columns of Ω.  
The system was estimated by maximum likelihood, subject to the constraints that βδ < 1 and that 
the dynamic behavior be stable.  Appendix A describes how an iterative process generated 
consistent starting values.  The delta method produced confidence intervals for the impulse 
responses; bootstrapping and/or Monte Carlo simulation would be computationally burdensome.    
5.2  Intervention’s Effect in the Friction Model  
  The left-hand side of Figure 5 shows the dynamic impact of a 3-standard-deviation shock 
to intervention on the foreign exchange levels and returns without restricting ω12.
15  The 
estimated impact is positive for both the DEM and the JPY but the confidence interval for the 
DEM is large enough to barely include zero.  One should be careful about interpreting the delta-
method confidence intervals, however. Correlation between the parameter estimates causes the 
Hessian to substantially overstate the true uncertainty about δ, β and ω12.  Section 5.5 explores 
the reasons for this in greater detail.  Contrary to the marginal significance implied by the 
confidence interventions in Figure 5, likelihood ratio tests clearly show that the initial impact of 
                                                                                                                                                             
nonlinear study, the way the structural parameters map into reduced-form moments depends on whether intervention 
is zero or not.  This provides different sets of reduced-form moments.   
15 The figures use a 3-standard-deviation shock in the friction-normal models because smaller shocks would often 
fail to meet the intervention threshold and would therefore have no impact.  Because the nonlinear model implies 
different effects of different-sized shocks, one cannot directly compare the linear and nonlinear results for some 
  16intervention (β) is statistically significant, with p-values of 0.012 for the DEM and 0.002 for the 
JPY. The estimated DEM point impact tends to fall slightly over time while that of the JPY tends 
to rise slightly.  
  The point estimates of the impact of intervention (β) imply that a $100 million USD 
purchase causes a 5 to 6 basis point USD appreciation in either the DEM/USD or JPY/USD 
markets.  Point estimates of β from the two markets were very similar.  It is difficult to cleanly 
compare the present results with those of the previous literature because the present model is 
dynamic and nonlinear, incorporating threshold effects.  In addition, intervention’s impact surely 
varies over time and with the nature of the exchange rate market.  Nevertheless, the present point 
estimates are broadly consistent with those from two well-known intervention studies.  
Dominguez (2003), who studied G-3 intervention at an intraday frequency, found that a $100 
million U.S. intervention in the DEM market had a maximal impact of almost 3 basis points.  
Using daily data, Kearns and Rigobon (2005) found that a $100 million Bank of Japan 
intervention had a 20-basis-point impact in the JPY/USD market, while the same-sized Reserve 
Bank of Australia intervention had a 1.3 to 1.8 percent impact in the smaller AUD/USD 
market.
16   
  To illustrate the sensitivity of the present results to seemingly innocuous identification 
assumptions, the right-hand side of Figure 5 shows the same dynamic impacts under the 
restriction that ω12 equals zero.  This seemingly minor change makes a very substantial impact 
on the impulse responses.  The estimated initial impact of intervention is now significantly 
                                                                                                                                                             
standard-sized shock.  The responses are computed to single shocks, although the structural shocks may be 
correlated.  
16  The small size of estimated effects of intervention might cause one to wonder about whether intervention is 
important.  Reitz and Taylor (2006) implicitly answer this question by laying out a nonlinear intervention model in 
which intervention serves to coordinate the expectations of rational speculators. 
  17negative (perverse) and is never significantly positive for either exchange rate, using the standard 
delta-method confidence bounds.   
  To summarize, inference about the effectiveness of intervention depends on the treatment 
of ω12.  When ω12 is freely estimated, β is larger and positive, implying that intervention has the 
desired impact on exchange rates in the friction model.  When ω12 is restricted to equal zero, the 
estimated impact of intervention is negative (perverse).  The data, however, strongly reject the 
restriction that ω12 equals zero and therefore we conclude that the model that provides 
economically sensible results (with ω12 free) is also statistically appropriate.  
Why do the results change when ω12 is restricted?  The restriction changes the estimated 
responses because the estimate of ω12 is correlated with the estimated initial impact of 
intervention on returns (β) and the estimated initial impact of returns on intervention (δam).  But 
these parameters play conceptually different roles in the assumed nonlinear data-generating 
process. Restricting ω12 forces the covariance between structural shocks to influence estimates of 
β and δam.  But likelihood ratio tests clearly reject the null that ω12 equals 0.  In other words, the 
restricted model is misspecified; one should expect incorrect answers.  These results, in which 
ω12 equals zero, illustrate the sensitivity of inference to false identification restrictions.   
5.3  The Intervention Reaction Function in the Friction Model 
Figure 6 illustrates the friction-model-implied dynamic impact of a 3-standard-deviation 
shock to overnight and business-day returns on intervention in the DEM/USD (top two panels) 
and JPY/USD markets (bottom two panels).  Again, the left-hand panels do not restrict ω12 while 
the right-hand panels restrict it to be zero.  The restriction on ω12 makes little difference for the 
estimated impact of overnight returns on intervention.  Intervention in both exchange rates show 
a (negative) leaning-against-the-wind reaction to overnight returns.  The restriction on ω12 does 
  18change the estimated impact of business-day returns, however.  When ω12 is restricted to equal 
zero in the right-hand panels, the model implies a leaning-against-the wind reaction to DEM 
returns (second panel on the right) and the shock to JPY returns is insufficient to overcome the 
intervention threshold (fourth panel on the right).   
The leaning-with-the-wind reaction implied by leaving ω12 unrestricted is very plausible, 
especially at very high frequencies.  Although central banks usually lean against recent trends in 
exchange rates, private communications with central bankers suggest that they often lean with 
the wind at very high (intraday) frequencies.  In addition, most central bankers who responded to 
Neely’s (2006) survey agree that skillful choices of trading opportunities within a day are 
important for an authority’s success in intervention.  
5.4  The Linear model vs. the friction model 
  Comparing the linear cases, Figure 3 and Figure 4, to the friction-model system, Figure 5 
and Figure 6, the unrestricted nonlinear case (ω12 free) implies a more consistently positive 
impact of intervention on exchange rates than does the linear case, while the restricted case (ω12 
= 0) implies an implausible, perverse effect.  The linear model clearly implies a leaning-against-
the-wind intervention reaction, which the nonlinear model confirms for overnight returns.  The 
treatment of ω12 governs intervention’s reaction to business-day returns in the nonlinear models:  
Permitting ω12 to be free identifies a tendency to lean with the wind at intraday frequencies.  
5.5  Identification in the friction model 
  Figure 5 shows that inference on the impact of intervention depends crucially on whether 
the covariance of the structural shocks ω12 is restricted.  As discussed previously, this sensitivity 
reflects correlation between the estimates of ω12, β and δam.  The correlations between β and δam 
for the DEM and JPY cases are -0.75 and -0.68, for example.  The correlations for β and ω12 are 
  190.86 for the DEM but only 0.01 for the JPY.
17   
  The geometric counterpart of correlation in parameter estimates is a ridge in the 
likelihood function. An examination of the likelihood surface—in Figure 7— as a function of {β, 
δam, ω12} pairs sheds light on the relation between the estimates. First, because the figure shows a 
maximum range of 0.8 standard errors for each parameter estimate, it is clear that these 
asymptotic robust standard errors substantially overstate the amount of uncertainty in the 
parameter estimates.  That is, the likelihood contour plots (rows 2 and 4 in Figure 7) fall away 
from the maximum faster than the standard errors would suggest and therefore imply much 
tighter bounds on the parameter estimates than the asymptotic standard errors.  The latter might 
be untrustworthy because the likelihood is maximized for values of the covariance terms (ω12) 
that are near the boundaries of their spaces.
18  ω12’s value is implicitly bounded by the restriction 
that the covariance matrix must be positive definite.     
  Why are the estimates of these parameters correlated?  In an unrestricted linear model, β, 
δam and ω12 are not separately identified.
19  The intervention/return covariance is a function of all 
three parameters.  The linear models estimated here—results in Figure 3 and Figure 4—used two 
restrictions, an instrument to identify β and δam, and ω12 set equal to zero, as is usual in structural 
VARs.  The friction model uses both an instrument and the nonlinearity of the model to 
separately identifyβ, δam and ω12.   
The correlation between the parameter estimates leaves the Hessian nearly singular; its 
inverse imprecisely estimates and exaggerates the true sampling uncertainty.  Therefore the 
                                                 
17 The restriction of ω12 probably strongly influences the estimate of β indirectly, through other parameters. 
18 An additional problem is the methods used to calculate numerical Hessians might not be very trustworthy in large 
nonlinear models with parameters of varying magnitudes. There is not much to be done about that, although 
rescaling the parameters might be of some help.  
  20delta-method confidence intervals are oversized; they show that intervention’s effects are 
marginally significant, while the likelihood ratio tests strongly reject the null that intervention 
has no effect.  
7.  Conclusion 
Recently, two research methods have furthered our understanding of the effects of 
intervention.  The first strand uses high-frequency data and information on the timing of 
intervention to conduct event studies of the behavior of exchange rates around intervention, e.g., 
Beattie and Fillion (1999), Fischer and Zurlinden (1999), Payne and Vitale (2003), Dominguez 
(2003a, 2003b),  Pasquariello (2002), Fatum and King (2005).  Such research has very usefully 
characterized the correlations in the data, but has been mostly silent on the structure of the 
economic system, making it very difficult to identify causality.  The second strand takes the 
identification issue seriously and uses lower-frequency data to identify the effect of intervention 
on exchange rates, as in Kim (2003) and Kearns and Rigobon (2005).   
This paper combines the advantages of these strands of the literature in proposing and 
estimating a new identification scheme, based on the usual timing of intervention, using macro 
announcement surprises as instruments for exchange rate changes in a nonlinear system.  The 
scheme identifies the dynamic cross-effects of intervention and foreign exchange rates. 
Using data from the period 1987 through 1990—where the data show relatively little 
evidence against stability—the linear model finds that U.S. intervention in the JPY market has a 
significant effect in the desired direction but the estimated effect of intervention in the DEM 
market is essentially zero.  The linear model picks up clear leaning-against-the-wind effects—
U.S. authorities buy (sell) USD when it has been depreciating (appreciating).  The linear model 
                                                                                                                                                             
  21
19 Instruments are equivalent to exclusion restrictions on regressors.  is used only as a benchmark, however, to illustrate the importance of nonlinearity and 
identification assumptions.   
Inference in the preferred nonlinear model generally differs from that of the linear system 
and depends on the treatment of the covariance of structural shocks.  When the covariance (ω12) 
is restricted to equal zero—which statistical tests strongly reject—the nonlinear system implies 
that intervention has a perverse effect on exchange rates but the business-day leaning-against-
the-wind reaction returns.  In other words, imposing a seemingly innocuous identification 
assumption, that the structural shocks may be correlated, implausibly implies that intervention 
has a significant perverse impact.  
When the covariance between contemporaneous exchange rate and intervention shocks (ω12) 
is freely estimated, the nonlinear system implies that intervention moves exchange rates 
significantly in the desired direction and intervention leans with-the-wind at intra-business-day 
frequency.  That is, all the nonlinear results with “ω12 free” model are reasonable, consistent with 
our knowledge of intervention policy and definitely statistically significant.  The conclusions of 
this “ω12 free” model are economically sensible and statistically preferred to any other model 
studied here.  This sensitivity illustrates the importance of attention to identification issues.  
  It would be desirable to extend the model in the present paper to investigate secondary 
questions in the intervention literature, such as the following:  Through what channel does 
intervention work?  Are coordinated interventions more effective?  Is the first intervention in a 
series more effective?  What are the cross-effects of intervention on volatility?
20  Unfortunately, 
it is not easy to answer such questions; the dynamic nonlinear models are difficult to estimate.  
But such research is underway.
  22Appendix A:  Identification and estimation of a friction-model system 
This appendix explains how the parameters of the friction-model system are identified and 
initially estimated from the reduced-form moments.  These iterative estimates are used as starting 
values for maximum likelihood estimates.  The following friction-model framework 
characterizes intervention:   
(A.1)   if    t I t t am a t pm p t u a X A r r I , 1 1 , , + + + + = δ δ 0 < t I  
(A.2)         i f     0 = t I 0 = t I  
(A.3)   ,  if     t I t t am a t pm p t u a X A r r I , 1 1 , , + − + + = δ δ 0 > t I
where Xt is a vector of all explanatory variables, excluding the constant.  The element of A1 
corresponding to the macro announcement is restricted to equal zero.  Note that the constant (a1 
> 0) enters (A.1) and (A.3) with different signs and the three conditions— ,  , 0 > t I 0 < t I 0 = t I —
can be rewritten as  ,    and 
.  The figure illustrates the relation of intervention to its 
latent value in a friction model. 
t t am a t pm p t I X A r r a u 1 , , 1 , − − − > δ δ t t am a t pm p t I X A r r a u 1 , , 1 , − − − − < δ δ
1 1 , , , 1 a X A r r u a t t am a t pm p t I > + + + > − δ δ
I(t) 
a1 
A1Xt + et  a1 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
20 Much work on the intervention/volatility relation has already been done, but some of the dynamic relations remain 
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where θ is the parameter vector, {φ, Φ} denote the normal density and cumulative normal 
density, respectively, and T1, T2 and T3 denote the sets of observations for which It is negative, 
zero and positive, respectively.   
The structural model for the system is conditional on the value that intervention takes.  If 
—the sets T1 and T3—it is equations  0 ≠ t I (A.1) and (A.3) along with the following: 
(A.5)    t pm t t pm u X A a r , 0 0 , + + =
(A.6)   .    t am t t t pm t am u X A a I r r , 2 2 , , + + + + = β ρ
The structural shocks—{ }—have covariance matrix Ω, with assumed structure   t am t I t pm u u u , , , , ,





















Note that the first dependent variable,  , is predetermined, so its structural form and 
reduced form coincide:  {a
t pm r ,
0, A0} = {π0, Π0}.  These can be directly estimated by least squares, as 
well as the residual variance (ω00).  Therefore, for identification and initial estimation purposes, 
                                                                                                                                                             
imprecisely estimated, due to the elaborate nature of the model. 
  24we can consider the 3-equation system to be a 2-equation system in It and   and treat   as 
another predetermined variable in those equations, subsuming it into X
t am r , t pm r ,
t. The coefficients on  , 
δ
t pm r ,
p and ρ, are subsumed into A1 and A2, respectively.  For simplicity, the notation will remain 
unchanged.   
 If  , then the structural equation for   becomes   0 = t I t am r ,
(A.8)    t am t t am u X A a r , 2 2 , + + =
and (A.2) describes It’s behavior.  (A.8) reflects the inclusion of the macro announcement in the 
matrix of predetermined variables, Xt. 
  The reduced form in the case that 0 < t I —the set of observations T1—is    
(A.9)  () () ( ) () ()
t t




u u X A A a a I
, 1 1 1
, , 2 1 2 1 1
1
+ Π + =





βδ  ,  if    ,  0 < t I
(A.10)  () () () () ()
t t




u u X A A a a r
, 2 2 2
, , 2 1 2 1 , 1
1
+ Π + =





βδ  , 
and if  —the set of observations T3—the reduced forms are as follows:  0 > t I
(A.11)  () () ( ) () ()
t t
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1
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βδ , if    0 > ,  t I
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1 1 .  The covariance matrix, W, of the 
reduced form errors, {w1t, w2t}, in {T1, T3} is as follows:  
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where Ω12 denotes the {2,3} submatrix of Ω defined in (A.7) and we denote the elements of 
W as {W11, W12, W22}. 
If  —the set of observations T2—the reduced forms are   0 = t I
(A.14)    ( ) ( ) ( )
() () t t a t am a t I t
t am a t I t a a t
w X u u X
u u X A A a a I
, 1 1 1 , , 1 1
, , 2 1 2 1
*
1 + Π + − = + + Ψ + =
+ + + + + − =
+ + π βδ δ ψ
δ δ δ
     0
* ≤ t I
(A.15)   
( ) ( ) ( )
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+ + Ψ + =





a t t a
t am a t I t





u u X A A a a I
, 1 1
1
1 , 1 1 1
, , 1 1






π βδ π βδ
δ ψ
δ δ δ
  ,  0
* ≥ t I
where   denotes the unobserved “shadow” value of intervention.  
*
t I (A.14) and (A.15) imply that, 
in T2, the reduced-form error obeys the following:    











− − ≥ ≥ Π − −
+ +
βδ
π π . 
And the reduced form for  ––in T2––is as follows:   t am r ,
(A.17)    .  t am t t am t t am u X u X A a r , 2 2 , 2 2 , + Ψ + = + + = ψ
A.1  Estimating the Model 
  We can estimate the reduced form for It, using all observations (sets T1, T2 and T3).  The 
likelihood function is given by the following:  
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1 π П1} and W11.   
 For  the   equations, the fact that the form of the equation depends on the behavior of I t am r , t 
complicates estimation of the reduced forms.  The equations hold only for a nonrandom subset of 
the observations and the error terms are not necessarily mean zero.   
(A.19)           i f     0 t t t am w X r , 2 2 2 , + Π + =
− π < t I  
(A.20)           i f     0 >   t t t am w X r , 2 2 2 , + Π + =
+ π t I
(A.21)         if   t am t t am t t am u X u X A a r , 2 2 , 2 2 , + Ψ + = + + = ψ 0 = t I  
  One can decompose the error in (A.19) through (A.21) into estimable functions and an 
uncorrelated mean-zero error:   
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  27This implies that 
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12 , , , , 1 , 1 1 , cov a a a t am a t I t am t t am u u u E w u βδ ω δ ω βδ δ − + = − + = .  One can 




1 π 11 —obtained by estimating the reduced form for 
the sets T1 and T2—in the above expressions and estimate them by least squares, using the T1, 
T3 and T2 observations, respectively, to get  2 2 2 2 2 ˆ and , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ Π Ψ
− + π π ψ . 
A.2  Identifying the Structural Parameters 
The following summarizes the relation between the structural parameters and the 
reduced-form parameters: 
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Recalling that we are treating   as a predetermined variable and that we obtain δ t pm r , p and ρ as 
part of A1 and A2, the structural parameters to be estimated are {β, δa, a1, a2, A1, A2, and the 3 




1 π 1 Π 11.  Estimation of  
(A.25) to (A.27)  provides  2 2 2 2 2 ˆ and , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ Π Ψ
− + π π ψ , as well as W12.  Implicitly, these can be used 
to construct W22.  The estimates of {ψ2,Ψ2}—which equals {a2, A2}—can be used to solve for β 
using the relation implied by solving for A1 and A2 in the structural {T1,T3} equations:  
,  .    is the ratio of the appropriate elements of   to  , 
because of the restriction on A
2 1 2 a = −
+ + βπ π 2 1 2 A = Π − Π β a δ ˆ
1 Π 2 Π
1, that the macro announcement has no direct effect on 
intervention.
21  Equation (A.29) can then be solved directly to provide  and  .  An estimate of 
A
1 ˆ a β ˆ
1 can be derived from (A.28) with  .    a δ ˆ
  Now, with consistent estimates of  , δ 1 A a, A2 and β, we can use the reduced form in set 
{T1,T3} to solve for the elements of the lower {2,3} submatrix of the structural covariance 
matrix, Ω, as follows: 
                                                 
21 The restriction on A1 that identifies δa, also permits us to take a more direct route to identifying the rest of the 
structural model than did Sickles and Schmidt (1978).  They studied a similar 2-equation framework with a Tobit 
model, rather than a friction model.  Usefully, they showed that the nonlinearity of the model always identifies the 
parameters of the second equation–the analogue of the ram,t equation in this paper–without restricting Ω or A2. 





































Thus, we have obtained consistent estimates of all the structural parameters.   
  To summarize, the procedure for estimating and identifying the model described by (A.1) 
to (A.6) is given by the following:  
(1) Estimate (A.5) by least squares, directly estimating A0 and Ω00.  Because   can be treated 
as a predetermined variable in the I
t pm r ,
t and   reduced forms, the contemporaneous 
coefficients δ
t am r ,
p and ρ can be treated as elements of A1 and A2. 
(2) Estimate the reduced form of the It equation in (A.18) by maximum likelihood, using all 
observations, to get  ,   and W 1 ˆ π 1 ˆ Π 11.   
(3) Estimate (A.25), (A.26) and (A.27) by least squares, using the consistent estimates— ,   
and  —in the regressors on the right-hand side.  
1 ˆ π 1 ˆ Π
11 ˆ W (A.25) and (A.26) are estimated jointly. 
These regressions provide  ,  ,  2 ˆ π 2 ˆ Π 2 ˆ ψ ,   and  .  Note that  2 ˆ Ψ 12 ˆ W 2 2 ˆ ˆ a = ψ  and  .  2 2 ˆ ˆ A = Ψ
(4) The restriction on A1—that that the macro announcement has no direct effect on 
intervention—identifies δa from the ratio of the appropriate elements of   and  .  1 ˆ Π 2 ˆ Π
(5) Using  ,   and  , one can solve for   and   with  a δ ˆ
1 ˆ Π 2 ˆ Π β ˆ
1 ˆ A (A.28).  
(6) Solve for Ω using previously estimated parameters– ,  and W – in  ˆ
a δ ˆ β ˆ ˆ (A.32).  
These iterative estimates are then used as starting values in maximum likelihood estimation.  
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  34Table 1: Summary statistics on intervention, returns and signed variance 
 
Notes:  The table provides summary statistics—mean, standard deviation, autocorrelations—on 
U.S. intervention (purchases of billions of USD), day and night log returns to the DEM/USD and 
JPY/USD rates.  The sample period is 1987 through 1990.  
  35Table 2:  Correlation among endogenous variables 
 
Notes:  The table shows correlation coefficients among the endogenous variables of the two data 
sets over the sample period: 1987 through 1990.  The variables are intervention (I)—U.S. 
purchases of billions of USD—business day returns (ram), and evening returns (rpm).   
 
  36Figure 1: Intervention, exchange rates and PPP fundamentals 
 
 
  37Figure 2:  Hours of reported intervention 
 
Notes:  The figure shows times of Reuters’s reports of U.S. intervention between 1987 and 1995.  
Times are in New York time and are rounded down to the nearest half hour.  The figure is similar 
to one reported in Dominguez (2003a).  
  38Figure 3:  Dynamic impact of intervention on exchange rates in the linear model 
 
Notes: The figure shows the dynamic impact of a one-standard-deviation purchase of USD on 
the DEM/USD rate (top panel) and the JPY/USD rate (bottom panel), along with an 80 percent 
confidence interval.  The x-axis denotes business days after the impact. Solid horizontal lines 
denote zero. 
  39Figure 4:  Impact of returns on intervention in the linear model 
 
Notes: The figure shows the dynamic impact of a one-standard-deviation increase in exchange 
rates (foreign currency per USD) on U.S. intervention (USD purchases).  The top panels show 
DEM results while the bottom panels show JPY results.  Dashed lines denote 80 percent 
confidence intervals. The x-axis denotes business days after the impact.  Solid horizontal lines 
denote zero. 
  40Figure 5: Impact of shocks to intervention on exchange rate returns/levels in the friction-normal 
system 
 
Notes: The figure shows the dynamic impact of a 3-standard-deviation shock to intervention on 
levels in the friction-model system, along with 80 percent confidence intervals, computed by the 
delta method.  Results from DEM/USD are in the first two panels and those from the JPY/USD 
are in the bottom two panels.  Panels on the right restrict ω12 to equal zero. The x-axis denotes 
business days after the impact. Solid horizontal lines denote zero. 
  41Figure 6:  Impact of returns on intervention in the friction-normal system 
 
Notes: The figure shows the friction-model-implied dynamic impact of a 3-standard-deviation 
 shock to business-day exchange rate returns on intervention, along with 80 percent confidence 
intervals, computed by the delta method.  Results from DEM/USD are in the first two panels and 
those from the JPY/USD are in the bottom two panels.  Panels on the right restrict ω12 to equal 
zero. The x-axis denotes business days after the impact. Solid horizontal lines denote zero. 
  42Figure 7:  The likelihood surface for the friction model as a function of β, δam and ω12
 
 
Notes:  The figure shows the likelihood surface for the friction model as a function of β, δ and 
ω12.  The first (third) row shows the likelihood surface for the DEM (JPY) as a function of {δ,β}, 
{δam, ω12} and {β, ω12}, respectively.  The second and fourth rows show the p-values for the 
likelihood ratio tests that the parameter pairs are significantly different than the value of the 
parameters that maximize the likelihood function.   
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